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INTERESTED DIRECTORS

Pennsylvania statute, the court, of necessity, will have less latitude
in taking the circumstances of each case into account than will
other courts that apply the majority rule. Regardless of the size of
the corporation, the nature of it, the number of directorships a particular director holds, the compensation received, or the demands of
the director's own affairs, a director in Pennsylvania must always
use the care a prudent man uses in his own affairs."
Where directors, as is the case in some large and some close
corporations, are, in reality, independent, highly paid professional
managers, the "own affairs" standard is not completely objectionable; but, this is not the universal situation. In the future should the
court find occasion to apply the statute literally and should it reach
a result different from the common law, corporations will be forced
into employing experienced, professional directors at adequate compensation. Without compensation or a personal interest in the
corporation's success, it is unlikely that one would be willing to
take on the responsibility of a directorship in a corporation of any
complexity.
ALBERT VICTOR WRAY

Corporations-Interested Directors-Fiduciary Duty and the
Business Judgment Rule
The business judgment rule is a defense to directors who, in the
exercise of their discretionary powers, cause corporate losses through
errors in judgment.' It is based on the assumption that the directors,
elected by the shareholders for this purpose, are in the best position
to decide corporate policy and that a court, less familiar with the
problems involved, should not substitute its judgment for that of the
directors.' The shareholders have no right to appeal to the courts
" For a criticism of the Pennsylvania statute as too subjective, see
Adkins 819. The comments to the NEw YoRK BUSINESS CORaORATioN LAW
§ 717 expressly recognizes the need for a flexible, comparative standard
of care: "The adoption of the standard prescribed by this section will allow
the court to envisage the directors' duty of care as a relative concept, depending on the kind of corporation involved, the particular circumstances
and the corporate role of the director."
'See Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132 (1891); Otis & Co. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 61 F. Supp. 905 (E.D.Pa. 1945), af'd per curiam 155 F.2d
522 (3d Cir. 1946); Spiegel v. Beacon Participations, Inc., 297 Mass. 398,
8 N.E.2d 895 (1937) ; Abrams v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E.2d 305 (1947).
2 See Coffman v. Maryland Publishing Co., 167 Md. 275, 173 Ati. 248
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for relief from the decisions made by the directors if such decisions
are made in good faith,3 with due care,4 and in accordance with
applicable fiduciary duties owed the corporation and its shareholders.'
While the shareholders do assume this risk of errors in judgment, they should not be held to assume the risk of disloyalty. The
rule does not protect directors who act in their own personal interest.' Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
minority shareholders to act in the best interest of the corporation.'
They cannot use their position of trust to benefit themselves or a
particular group of shareholders at the expense of the corporation
or its other shareholders. 8 A recent decision by the Delaware Supreme Court illustrates how the business judgment rule will occasionally be expanded into this area of fiduciary duty to uphold
an otherwise suspect transaction by interested directors.
In Warshaw v. Calhoun the plaintiff was a minority share(1934); Helfman v. American Light & Traction Co., 121 N.J. Eq. 1, 187

tl. 540 (1936); Pollitz v. Wabash R.R., 207 N.Y. 113, 100 N.E. 721
(1912); Marony v. Applegate, 266 App. Div. 412, 42 N.Y.S.2d 768 (1943).
' See Dumont v. Raymond, 49 N.Y.S.2d 865 (Sup. Ct. 1944); Howell v.

McClosky, 373 Pa. 100, 99 A.2d 610 (1953).
'Casey v. Woodruff, 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (Sup. Ct. 1944).

'Evans v. Armour & Co., 241 F. Supp. 705 (E.D.Pa. 1965); Abrams
v. Allen, 297 N.Y. 52, 74 N.E,2d 305 (1947); Steinberg v. Altschuler, 158
N.Y.S.2d 411 (Sup. Ct. 1956); Howell v. McClosky, 375 Pa. 100, 99 A.2d

610 (1953).

' Geddes v. Anaconda Copper Mining Co., 254 U.S. 590 (1920); Alster
v. British Type Investors, 83 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1949); Shlensky
v. South Parkway Bldg. Corp., 19 Ill. 2d 268, 166 N.E.2d 793 (1960);
Bayer v. Beran, 49 N.Y.S.2d 2 (Sup. Ct. 1944).
'SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1942); Perlman v. Feldmann,
219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 952 (1955); Zahn v.
Transamerica Corp., 162 F.2d 36 (3d Cir. 1947); Lebold v. Inland Steel
Co., 125 F.2d 369 (7th Cir. 1941), cert. denied 316 U.S. 675 (1942);
Remillard Brick Co. v. Remillard-Dandini Co., 109 Cal. App. 2d 405, 241
P.2d 66 (1952) ; Guth v. Loft, 23 Del. Ch. 255, 5 A.2d 503 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ;
Kavanaugh v. Kavanaugh Knitting Co., 226 N.Y. 185, 123 N.E. 148 (1919).
'He who is in such a fiduciary position cannot serve himself first
He cannot use his power for his personal
and his cestius second ....
advantage and to the detriment of the stockholders and creditors no
matter how absolute in terms that power may be and no matter how
meticulous he is to satisfy technical requirements.
Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295, 311 (1939).
"221 A.2d 487 (Del. 1966).

See also Case v. New York Central R.R., 15 N.Y.2d 150, 204 N.E.2d

643, 256 N.Y.S.2d 607 (1965), reversing 19 App. Div. 2d 383, 243 N.Y.S.2d
620 (1963). This case involved a suit by minority shareholders in a
Central subsidiary challenging an agreement between the two linked corporations. The agreement, entered into by interlocking directors, provided
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holder in Western Insurance Securities Co. Securities, a personal
holding company, was organized for the purpose of controlling
Western Casualty and Surety Co.; its only substantial asset being a
controlling block of stock in Casualty. The individual defendants,
majority shareholders in Securities,"0 were officers and/or directors
of both companies. In 1953, when it became necessary to obtain
additional capital and to broaden the public ownership of Casualty,
the defendants approved a plan to issue new stock with the purchase
rights going to Casualty shareholders. The defendants, in their
capacity as directors of Securities, then rejected Securities' rights
in the issue and sold the rights to the underwriters handling the
issue for Casualty. Similar new issues were made by Casualty in
1959 and 1962 and again Securities sold its rights. These combined transactions led to a reduction of Securities' holdings in
Casualty from 92 to 41 per cent and a corresponding reduction in
the equity Securities' shareholders had in the profits of Casualty.
The loss suffered by the shareholders was magnified by the fact that
Securities' stock had always sold at a 25 to 50 per cent discount
from the value of its assets. The Supreme Court of Delaware,
affirming the Chancellor's grant of summary judgment for defendants," held that the plaintiff was not entitled to an accounting
from the individual defendants for losses resulting from the transaction or to the appointment of a receiver for the liquidation or
reorganization of Securities.'
for the allocation to Central of almost all of the tax savings realized from the
consolidation of the tax returns of the two companies. The Court of Appeals,
reversing the Appellate Division, held that the transaction was fair when
analyzed from the viewpoint of the "system" as a whole, indicating that
what was good for the system of railroads was good for the constituent
parts. While the court did not specifically mention the business judgment
rule, it would seem that this decision also offers an illustration of the expansion of the rule into the traditional area of fiduciary duty.
" The defendants held fifty-five per cent of the stock in Securities. The
fact that a majority of the stock in the corporation was owned by less than
five shareholders and that Securities sole income was from dividends earned
on its holdings in Casualty led to its classification as a personal holding
company. The retained earnings of a personal holding company are taxed
at a confiscatory rate. See Int. Rev. Code of 1954, §§ 541-42.
11
Warshaw v. Calhoun, 213 A.2d 539 (Del. Ch. 1965).
The plaintiff sought to have a receiver appointed to liquidate, reorganize, or merge Securities with Casualty in order to eliminate the disadvantages inherent in Securities corporate form. The court held that the
severe tax consequences of the personal holding company status did not
justify the appointment of a receiver and that the continuation of the corporation in this form was not illegal. The court indicated that the plaintiff's
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There were sound business reasons advanced by defendants that,
on the face of the transaction, would seem to justify the application
of the business judgment rule. Securities, a personal holding
company,' was subject to a confiscatory tax'4 on retained earnings
and was without the necessary funds to exercise the rights itself.
The underwriter advised that a plan to pass the rights on to the
shareholders of Securities would increase the cost and risk the
success of the underwriting. Also the plan would defeat one of the
primary purposes of the new issue, i.e. to broaden the public ownership of Casualty stock. The court listed these factors and said,
"Whether or not this be so, we think that the decision as to what
Securities should do with its rights to subscribe to Casualty stock
was a matter to be decided in accordance with the sound business
judgment of the directors of Securities."' 5
The court gave only passing reference to the plaintiff's claim
that defendants were remiss in not transferring the rights to Securities' shareholders and that this was done in order to perpetuate
defendants' control over Casualty through their control of Securities.
There would seem to be sufficient evidence of a conflict of interest
such as would hamper defendants in giving the transaction the
disinterested consideration required for application of the business
judgment rule.' Where there is such a taint on a transaction, the
court should examine all of the circumstances surrounding the decision to determine if in fact it was in the best interest of the corporation. 7 Here the court should have weighed the possible increased cost and threatened risk involved in passing the rights on
to the shareholders against the loss suffered. The court should have
also determined if there were other means of accomplishing the
purpose of the issues without depleting the shareholders interest.
If these factors had been considered the court may have determined
that the directors did not act in the best interest of the corporation.
Cheff v. Mathes s offers another example of this use of the
business judgment rule to uphold a transaction blocking a potential
remedy was to withdraw
cussion of this aspect of
"' See Int. Rev. Code
1 See Int. Rev. Code

from the corporation by the sale of her stock. Disthe case is beyond the scope of this note.
of 1954, § 542.
of 1954, § 541.

15221 A.2d 487, 492 (Del. 1966).

oSee note 7 supra and accompanying text.

1?
18

See note 23 infra and accompanying text.
199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1963).
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shift in control. Here the plaintiff brought a derivative suit to hold
the directors of Holland Furnace Corporation liable for losses resulting from the allegedly improper use of corporate funds to purchase the corporation's own stock. The controlling shareholders,
who were members of the corporation's founding family and who
made up the board of directors, learned that one Maremont was
buying large quantities of Holland stock on the market. Maremont
had a reputation for realizing quick profits from the sale or liquidation of corporations he acquired and there was some indication that
he intended to change corporate policy. The board of directors, fearing such a take over, caused the corporation to purchase Maremont's
shares at a price in excess of the market value. Plaintiff, a minority
shareholder, attacked the transaction, alleging that its sole purpose
was the perpetuation of the incumbent directors' control. The Vice
Chancellor, agreeing with the plaintiff, disallowed the purchase on
the grounds that there was no substantial evidence that any real
threat was posed to the corporation."9 The Supreme Court of Delaware reversed, holding that the directors, having satisfied the bur-,
den of proof by showing that they had reasonable grounds to believe
that a substantial threat to the corporation or its policies existed,
would not be penalized for an honest mistake in judgment.
The direct effect of this transaction was to insure that the control
held by the incumbent directors was preserved through the use of
corporate funds. A purchase by the corporation of its own shares
in order to maintain control is an abuse of corporate power and a
breach of fiduciary duty,2" yet the court-did not give full consideration to the question of conflicting interest. One commentator has
questioned the immediacy of the threat because it would be necessary
for Maremont to obtain a majority of the stock or support from a
majority of the shareholders before he could control the board of
directors and influence corporate policy.2 1 Also, before upholding
such a transaction it would seem that the court should have determined if there were other means, using non-corporate funds, to
have eliminated the danger. The founding family should have resorted to their own resources before those of the corporation.
One possible explanation of the holdings in these cases is that
524 (Del. Ch. 1963).
" Mathes v. Cheff, 190 A.2d
Kahn v. Schiff, 105 F. Supp. 973 (S.D. Ohio 1952); Yasik v.
25 Del. Ch. 247, 17 A.2d 309 (1941).
Wachtel,
" Note, 50 CORNEIL L.Q. 302 (1965).
2See
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the plaintiffs purchased shares in corporations with well established
control patterns. In Warshaw, Securities was organized by the
defendants as a device to insure their control over Casualty while
in Cheff the founding family had set corporate policy and controlled
the corporation from the outset. It may be that by using the business
judgment rule in these cases the court is merely saying that the
plaintiffs accepted these circumstances when they purchased their
shares and cannot now complain.2" If so, the court is overlooking
the realities involved in a stock purchase. The purchaser does not
agree to future action by those in control that will cause corporate
losses in an effort to maintain that control.
The court in each of these cases probably reached the correct
result as the challenged transactions, all factors considered, may
well have been in the best interest of the corporations. By using
the business judgment rule, however, the courts avoided analysis
of the essential question presented-the possible self-dealing of the
directors. The basis of the rule is to allow directors freedom to act
without fear of being "second-guessed" by a court should they make
a mistake. Where the loss is caused by such a conflict of interests
that the directors are deprived of their ability to exercise impartial
judgment this reason for the rule fails. In this situation the courts,
in order to protect the minority shareholders, have a duty to "second-guess" the directors and to carefully scrutinize the transaction.23
"'In Goodman v. Futrovsky, 213 A.2d 899 (Del. 1965), the court was
faced with an attack by a minority shareholder on an arrangement whereby
a concern owned by the majority shareholders was the sole supplier of the
supermarket corporation's produce requirements. Prior to 1959, when
there was a public issue of supermarket stock, the majority shareholders
owned both businesses. The prospectus for the issue set forth this relationship between the two companies and explained the interest of the majority
shareholders. The court held that because the present holders of supermarket stock trace their title to the purchase of the 1959 issue "they are
bound by their acquiescence, with full knowledge, of their predecessors and
are now precluded from attacking the . . . relationship. Id. at 903. The
court in Warshaw and Cheff may have been thinking along these lines in
deciding those cases.
" Cf. Litwin (Rosemarin) v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940)
where the court said that a director
owes loyalty and allegiance to the corporation-a loyalty that is undivided and an allegiance that is influenced in action by no consideration other than the welfare of the corporation. Any adverse interest

of a director will be subjected to a scrutiny rigid and uncompromising.

He may not profit at the expense of his corporation and in conflict
with its rights; he may not for personal gain divert unto himself the
opportunities which in equity and fairness belong to his corporation.
He is required to use his independent judgment.

RIGHT TO TREATMENT
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The minority shareholder in a modem corporation is essentially
without a voice in the management of the corporation. 24 The one
remaining device with which he can protect his investment from
the self-dealing of those in control is through a shareholders derivative action on behalf of the corporation. Through such an action
he can enforce the fiduciary duties owed by the management. The
courts, by permitting the expansion of the business judgment rule
into the traditional enclave of the director's "duty of loyalty," are
removing a substantial portion of this protection. In most situations
where directors enter into such a transaction, they will be able to
put forth plausible business reasons in its support, but they may not
always be able to satisfy the demands of undivided loyalty.
REED JOHNSTON, JR.

Criminal Law-Committed Patient's Right to Treatment in

Public Mental Hospitals
Nineteenth century attitudes toward insanity were responsible
for the conception of a lunatic asylum as an institution for the public
safety. The conditions in the asylums reflected the wild beast notion of mental illness ' -- the essential function of the asylum was
Id. at 677.
In the analogous situation where the directors contract with their own
corporation, or where corporations with common directors contract together, the majority rule calls for close scrutiny of the contract to insure
its fairness. See Bank of United States v. Cuthbertson, 67 F.2d 182 (4th
Cir. 1933), cert. denied 291 U.S. 665 (1933); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United

States, 44 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Wash. 1942), ajffd 139 F.2d 69 (9th Cir.
1942); Tucson Federal Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Aetna Inv. Corp., 74 Ariz.
163, 245 P.2d 423 (1952); Kennedy v. Emerald Coal & Coke Co., 28

Del. Ch. 405, 42 A.2d 398 (1944); Everett v. Phillips, 288 N.Y. 227, 43
N.E.2d 18 (1942).
24

The modern large American corporation enjoys almost complete

independence from its stockholders, the principal source of external

intereference. While lip service is always paid to democratic control by the owners, it is recognized in practice that any extensive
and effective interference by stockholders in management would be
exceedingly damaging.
GALBRAITu, EcoxomIc DEVELOPMENT IN PERSPECTIVE, 65-66 (1962).

Ownership of wealth without appreciable control and control of
wealth without appreciable ownership appear to be the logical out-

come of corporate development.

BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CO1RORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTT,
(1933).
'Rex v. Arnold, 16 How. St. Tr. 695, 764 (1742).
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